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The fundamental  political economy of early commitment to
grandiose  projects  of uncertain  environmental  consequence  has
not been  overturned.  Projects  with  environmental  impacts  often
have  unacceptably  low  rates  of retum;  governments  and  interna-
tional agencies fiequently  fail to reject projects of this type.
Mire realistic  evaluations  will help.  It is important  to hold those
responsible  for appraising  a project accountable  for their ap-
praisals.
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Lending  institutions'  initial appraisals  often  weight  to environmental  risks.  The fundamental
ignore  the true costs of environmental  impacts,  political  economy  of early commitment  to
and many  development  projects  are launched  grandiose  projects  of uncertain  environmental
despite retums  that are often  below the cost of  consequences  has not been  overtumed.
capital and all too often  actually  negative.
It is also important  to develop  better ap-
Most environmental  impacts are  negative,  so  praisal  methodologies  and to hold those prepar-
approving  a project with a low true rate of return  ing initial  project appraisals  accountable  for their
is not only a financial  waste  but a gratuitous  appraisals.  If post-project  evaluations  do not
stress on the ecosystem.  Ecosystems  typically  capture the most significant  environmental  costs,
have a low tolerance  for such impacts,  so low-  analysts  conducting  appraisals  early in the
yielding  projects  entail serious  ecosystem  project's life are unlikely  to worry  about  being
opportunity  costs.  caught  out by their unfounded  optimism or their
disregard  for environmental  consequences.
Ascher explores  why projects  with environ-
mental  impacts so often  have  lower-than-  The good  news is that in policy reform  and
anticipated  rates  of return, and what can be done  structural  adjustment  the movement  is toward
to remedy  the situation.  eliminating  blatant  risk-seeking  and making
government  institutions  accountable  for the
Many observers  are optimistic  because  there  results of their own actions.  Although  the
is more environmental  awareness  than  there was  conditionalities  imposed  by intemational  funding
in the 1970s  and early 1980s  and environmental  insttutions can be helpful,  the primary responsi-
screening  is more a part of project evaluation.  bility for designing  and selecting  appropriate
But, says Ascher,  attention  to environmental  risk  projects  that have an environmental  impact  still
has not yet provoked  the structural  changes  in  lies with the governments  of the developing
government  institutions  that would allow  for the  world.
development  of incentives  that give  proper
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of  energy, and demand for  food.  Under current practices, the  result could be appalling
environmental conditions in  both urban and rural areas.  The World Development Report
presents an alternative, albeit more difficult, path - one that,  if taken, would allow future
generations to  witness improved environmental conditions accompanied by rapid economic
development  and the virtual eradication  of widespread  poverty. Choosing this path will require
that both industrial  and developing  countries seize the current moment  of opportunity  to reform
policies, institutions, and aid programs.  A two-fold strategy is required.
* First, take advantage  of the positive  links between  economic.  efficiency, income  growth,
and protection  of the environment. This calls for accelerating  programs for reducing  poverty,
removing  distortions that encourage the economically  inefficient  and environmentally  damaging
use of natural resources, clarifying  property rights, expanding  programs for education  (especially
for girls), family planning  services, sanitation  and clean  water, and agricultural  extension, credit
and research.
v  Second, break the negative links between economic activity and the environment.
Certain targeted measures, described in  the  Report, can bring dramatic improvements in
environmental  quality at modest  cost in investment  and economic  efficiency. To implement  them
will require overcoming the power of vested interests, building strong institutions, improving
knowledge,  encouraging  participatory  decisionmaking,  and building  a partnership  of cooperation
between industrial and developing  countries.
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Development  projects with significant  environmental  impacts  pose special  challenges  for
developing countries and the international institutions that help finance their development.
Whether these projects directly exploit the natural resource base (e.g., timber exploitation)  or
have an  incidental impact (e.g.,  a  highway through a  wilderness area),  they are  often
accompanied  by distinctive  problems  that threaten their own overall viability. Even worse, the
ex ante evaluations  of these "environmental  impact"  projects' often ignore the costs, delays and
reduced benefits that result from these impacts. Thus, many such projects are launched  despite
the fact that their returns to the overall economy  are often below the cost of capital and - in all
too many cases - actually negative. Since, as will be argued, most environmental  impacts  are
negative, the approval  of a project with a low true rate of return is not only a waste of financial
resources, but also a gratuitous eco-system  stress.  Since eco-systems  typically have a limited
tolerance  for such impacts, low-yielding  projects entail serious "eco-system  opportunity  costs".
This  paper explores why enviionmental-impact  projects so  often have lower than
anticipated rates of return, and what can be done to remedy the problem.  Disappointing  rates
of return reflect two intertwined  problems. One is that many  project designs do not address the
negative  impacts  of projects that affect the environment,  and therefore actual rates of return will
be low once the costs of environmental  damage, and additional  efforts to mitigate  this damage,
are taken into account. The related policy  challenges  are either to design projects that minimize
negative  environmental  impacts, or to change  development  strategies  to avoid projects that pose
excessive environmental  risks.  The second problem is that the ex ante appraisals of projects
with environmental impacts  are typically too optimistic  because they ignore the costs of these
impacts  -- though not with such consistency  from one project to another that a simple standard
adjustment  to the calculated  ex ante rate of return could give a reliable estimate  of the true rate
of return.  Here, the challenge  is to develop a better analytic and policymaking  framework  that
can avoid misidentifying  problematic  projects as good projects.
Consequently,  the following  is a two-part analysis: a general exploration  of the factors
that diminish  the rates of return of environmental-impact  projects; and an exploration  of why the
appraisal  process often misses  or under-estimates  the importance  of these factors. It is important
to clarify why these are different issues: project design and project appraisal are not equivalent.
Theoretically, project design could be viewed as the selection of the highest-yielding  project
alternatives  generated  by an exhaustive  appraisal of possible  project designs. However, the set
of possible project and design variarnts  is infinite, and designing  a project is a time- and staff-
consuming task.  In practice, out of the infinity of conceivable options, only a very limited
number can be selected for development  into concrete project proposals.  There is, therefore,
I  Throughout  this paper I will use the somewhat  awkward term "environmental  impact
project" to denote development  projects that have an effect on eco-systems. The use of this
term is to avoid confusion between "environmental  projects", which by common usage are
projects designed to mitigate  environmental  damage, and projects that impinge upon the
environment.
1no practical  possibility  of designing  projects  by deciding  whether  to adopt  or discard  each  of the
total set of conceivable  options. Instead,  project  design  must  proceed  through  the application
of  principles of  desigr.; for example, balancing  centralized  and decentrized  authority,
minimizing  penetration  into unknown physical systems, relying on incentives  to induce
compliance  to the regulations  contained  within  project  operations,  and so on.  Appraisal,  in
contrast,  entails  forecasting  the impacts  of a gi=n project  design  once  it has been specified  in
detail.  Good  appraisal,  while  essential  for deciding  whether  to go ahead  with any particular
project, cannot  by itself generate  a list of optimal  projects. Since design  and appraisal  are
different,  the methods,  institutions  and politics  of each  differ  as well. Improving  project  design
and project  appraisal  must  be analyzed  as distinct  challenges.
Preview  of Findings  and Conclusions.
On the basis of case studies of project selection,  reviews  of specific  projects  with
environmental  impacts,  and a review  of several  statistical  studies  of returns  on World  Bank
projects,  this paper develops  the following  diagnoses:
1. Projects with environmental  impacts often have unacceptable  rates of  return because
unintended  eco-system  impacts  are more likely to have deleterious  than beneficial  effects,
through:
* disruptions  of positive  eco-system  chains;
* delays  for environmental  mitigation;
* delays  due to political  or environmental  opposition;
* higher  costs  required  by unknown  physical  condidions;
* unanticipated  reactions  by the eco-system  to the project's  impacts;
* deviations  from the optimal  match between  project scope and the natural
resource  base.
2. Governments  and international  funders  often  fail to reject unacceptable  projects  because:
* institutional  pressures  give problematic  projects  the benefit  of the doubt,  as the
institutions  that formulate,  fund  or implement  development  projects  often  benefit
from proceeding  with  the project,  regardless  of its costs  and merit;
*  some components  of  environmental  risk are still excluded  from project
appraisal,  including  uncertainty  about  consequences  likely  to be negative  and low-
probability  risks  of very large costs;
* rate-of-return  predictions  are typically  not true forecasts,  since  they presume
project  adoption  as proposed;
* goverments  often  form  premature  commitments  to problematic  project  designs;
* "bold"  projects,  often  entailing  greater  risk of overrun,  delay  and environmental
damage,  are politically  and professionally  popular;
* governments  often dismiss  environmental  critiques  as unreasonable  or even
political  attacks.
2On the basis of these diagnoses, the analysis suggests that better project design and
selection  can be addressed by governments  and international  funders if they:
1. Alter project design in order to:
* favor maintenance  over frontier projects;
* emphasize program over project commitments;
*  permit  adaptive management by  sequencing problematic engineering and
environmental  mitigation  early in project development;
* reduce the "rent" component  of development  projects.
2. Alter institutions  and processes in order to:
* internalize institutional  costs of environmental  risks;
* enliance the impact of independent  evaluation;
* expand the knowledge  base;
*  institutionalize  environmental  caution  by  incorporating  presumptive
environmental  costs for project types that are likely to have a priori unknowable
environmental  impacts.
B.  Why Environmental Impact  Projects Are Prone to Low Rates of Return
It is important to recognize  that development  projects in general are subject to several
problems leading to  low rates of return.  Projects with environmental impacts share these
problems, and even where ecosystem  effects  are not the sole cause of disappointing  returns, the
environment suffers from whatever stress economically  gratuitous projects put on it.  While
several studies purport to show that the most recent set of World Bank projects subject to
appraisal' have ex post rates of return  -- estimated at the beginning of project operations --
averaging around 15-16% (World Bank Operations  Evaluation Department 1989; 1990a;  Pohl
and Mihaljek 1989),  they are referring not to the actual rates of return calculated  after the impact
of project operations have been established, but rather to the re-estimations  of future operations
from the time that project construction  has been completed. These so-called ex  ost rates of
return do reflect knowledge  of actual project development  costs, the impact of start-up delays,
and more updated estimates  of the benefit and cost flows.  Yet they  do not capture the empirical
results of  the  true outcomes of  project operations, nor do  they measure the  impacts of
unanticipated  environmental  costs except in so far as project expenditures  have been made to
address the latter.  Thus, despite the fact that these evaluations  seem to have an average rate of
return above the cut-off point for acceptable  projects, the estimation  of returns well after project
start-up barely surpasses the cost of capital.  Daniel Kaufmann  (1990: 5-6) found that the rates
2  Some categories of projects, such as social service or institutional  upgrading  projects,
are excluded because their retums are difficult to define and estimate.
3of return of World Bank  projects (excluding  social-service  projects), recalculated  5-8 years _f3E
the beginning  of operation, average only 11 per cent.  For many projects the rate of return is
below the cost of capital or even negative. This finding  is all the more striking  given that World
Bank  projects have been subjected  to relatively  rigorous screening, and that the World Bank  can
often "skim" the most attractive from the entire range of projects available in the country.
Kaufmann  (and others) show that macro-policy  distortions, such as overvalued  exchange
rates, trade restrictions, and poor fiscal policies, partially account  for the disappointing  rates of
return.  Since environmental-impact  projects are generally subject to the same macro-policy
regimes, they are likely  to face these same problems. Indeed,  a large proportion  of Kaufmann's
sample  comprises  environmental-impact  projects, since many were agricultural  and major public
works projects.
Yet Kaufmann finds that macro-policy distortions can account for only  15% of the
variance in  ex pgs  rates of return.  If policy distortions could have been measured more
completely  and accurately,  perhaps  their explanatory  power would  be higher. Yet it seems  clear
that for  development projects in  general, including projects with environmental impacts,
additional impediments  must also be present. This leaves  open the possibility that other factors
beyond the policy regime, including  characteristics  of the projects themselves  and the processes
by which they are initiated  and implemented,  share responsibility  for the low rates of return.
The Distinctive Problems of Environmental  Impact Projects
Although  these calculated  ex post rates of return are evidently  problematic,  even they do
not capture all the negative  consequences  of environmental  change. This is because the standard
appraisal methodology  does not add environmental  damage to the project costs unless explicit
environmental mitigation is  included as  a  project  component.  Ironically, unaddressed
environmental  damage  is typically  ignored in ex post appraisal, while addressed environmental
threats or damage are  included, via the added project costs of design changes to avoid the
danage or environmental  mitigation  to correct it.  Thus, as long as unaddressed  environmn,atal
impacts  tend to be more negative  than positive,  actual ex post rates of return will be even worse
than calculated.
To explore the  fate of  environmental-impact  projects specifically, this analysis has
reviewed the sixteen  most recent projects evaluated  by the World Bank's Operations  Evaluation
Department  in the forestry, highway, hydroelectric/irrigation,  and mining  sectors. The projects
and summary information  on their outcomes  are listed in the Appendix.
It is important  to keep in mind that the recalculated  rates of return of these projects were
estimated  at the start-up  of operations,  and do not therefore reflect empirical measures  of project
benefits, nor the impact  of unforeseen  problems. Moreover,  as mentioned  above, even  identified
environmental  costs are not necessarily  taken into account in the cost-benefit  calculation. For
example, Brazil's Carajas Iron Ore Project is acknowledged to have created environmental
damage  beyond the project's own operations,  including  deforestation  and watershed  degradation,
but the calculated ex post rate of return does not incorporate these costs.
Consequently it is especially disappointing that very few projects, aside from road
maintenance  projects, have reported "actual"  rates of return clearly above the hurdle rate of ten
4to twelve  percent.  But the set of projects is too small to establish  whether  projects that impinge
upon the envi).inment have systematically  lower estimated ex post and actual rates of return.
In order to examine a larger set, we can turn to the Operations Evaluation  Department's latest
annual review of  post-construction appraisals.  Taking the  sectoral categories as  rough
distinctions  between projects with and without significant  environmental  impacts, it is possible
to invoke at least indirect evidence that such impacts are associated  with lower rates of return.
The evaluation of 1989 projects, focusing on the 116 projects for which the economic  rate of
return is an appropriate indicator, reports a weighted average economic rate of return of 15
percent. (World Bank Operations Evaluation  ')epartment 1990a:  2-17)  Yet,
As in previous year's cohorts, re-estimated  ERRs were in general relatively high
in infrastructure and urban operations..  .Re-estimated  ERRs in agriculture were
mostly in the 6-10 percent range; those in electric power ranged from 10-15
percent; and those in  irrigation and drainage, from 5-10 percent.  Those in
highways tended to be higher than 20 percent, and those in telecommunications
ranged from 10-15 percent. In other sectors no pattern was discernible. (World
Bank Operations Evaluation Department  1990a:  2-18)
If we bear in mind that by 1989 most of the highway  projects reaching completion  were
partly or largely highway maintenance  or improvement  projects, the pattern seems to confirm
that projects with potential  to have  the greatest  environmental  impacts,  namely in agriculture and
irrigation,  have  the  most problematic re-estimated rates  of  return,  even  without taking
environmental  impacts  fully  into account. These patterns  are consistent  with the historical  record
of unsuccessful  projects, which shows  that for projects evaluated  over the entire 1974-88  period,
one-third of agricultural  and rural development  projects were deemed  failures, compared  to only
one-eighth for industrial projects.  In Africa and Latin America, the two ecological frontier
regions, agricultural projects have poorer records (49% and 76% respectively)  than in Asia,
North Africa and the Middle  East. Similarly,  the irrigation  projects in Africa and Latin America
have a far worse success record (38% and 33% respectively)  than irrigation projects in Asia,
North Africa and the Middle East (93% and 85% respectively). (World Bank Operations
Evaluation  Department 1989: 13)4
Returning to our small sample, we can examine what components  of the cost-benefit
analysis have gone awry.  Twelve of the sixteen projects had lower benefits than estimated at
the time of project appraisal.  One frequently  ercountered reason for disappointing  benefits is
3  This is typically set at 10% for World Bank projects, and 12% for International
Development  Association  projects reserved for the poorest countries.  The rationale for
higher minimum  acceptable rates of ic-jrn is the greater scarcity  of capital; since IDA funds
are essentially grants rather than loans, the hunds  are accordingly  scarcer.
4  While in the case of Africa these records are in keeping with the region's overall
record of project failures, other Latin American  projects have had a reasonable  record of
success.
5decline (or lack of projected  increase)  in the price of the project's outputs; this frequently  occurs
if the appraisal's price forecasts do not take the price impact of the project itself into account,
or if the government fails to impose adequate user fees for irrigation or electricity-generation
projects. Benefits  that disappoint  as a result of environmental  or ecosystem  reactions  ,  are
found largely in the hydro-power and irrigation sectors (where siltation, waterlogging and
salinization  are common  outcomes) and in social forestry (where planting often does not have
the expected yields, because of uncertainties  of the survival  of the species planted, climatic or
soil conditions, and the vigilance  of those who plant and care for the trees).
Some environmental  costs probably go unreported  for all the projects in the sample, with
the possible exception of  the road improvenient  projects.  Even so,  thirteen of  the sixteen
projects showed explicit cost underestimates  in the post-construction  appraisal.  Projects that
encountered unanticipated physical obstacles or  environmental problems requiring attention
during the construction  phase showed  higher explicit costs. For example, in Nepal's Kulekhani
Hydroelectric Project, the cost of civil works had to be raised 12% after an extensive site
examination made it clear that significant design modifications  were required.  Costa Rica's
Fourth Highway  Project  also encountered  higher costs when terain and geological  details  became
known.
Project completion  delays were the most consistent  cause of cost overruns.  Only fcur
of the sixteen projects did not have significant  delays in project completion  and start-up.  Two
of these were Indian "social forestry" projects, in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat; neither required
"construction", nor faced the risk of requiring environmental  mitigation, before the start of
operations. Forestry projects involving  replanting  on degraded  land or community  woodlots  do
not have to confront  the removal  of natural vegetation  or the construction  of complex plantation
infrastructure; there is therefore little danger  of unknown  physical  or environmental  conditions
leading to delays in the project.  Of course, while the project may proceed on schedule, yields
may be far under expectations. Indeed, in both of these cases, lower-than-anticipated  rates of
return were due to disappointing  yields in addition to unforeseen  declines  in the price .,f wood.
The third "on-time"  package  was the Central African  Republic's Third and Fourth Roads
Projects; these were largely road rehabilitation  efforts that did not penetrate  new areas (the Third
Central African Republic  Roads Project paved a segment  of the pre-existing international  route
to Cameroon; the Fourth Roads Project was for road rehabilitation  and institutional  upgrading).
While even road rehabilitation  projects sometimes  fall behind schedule  because of difficulties
with contractors, as in the case with equipment  procurement for Rwanda's Fourth Highway
Project, highway improvement  projects seem to be less vulnerable to delays.  This is because
they tend not to encounter physical and environmental  uncertainties  as much as othrr projects.
The only "on-time"  project that did involve major construction  and ecosystem  penetration
was Brazil's Carajas Iron Ore Project.  This may seem puzzling, since the $3 billion Carajas
Project, one of  the largest natural resource projects in the developing world, required the
development of open pit mines, mining towns, port facilities, and roads, and might therefore
have been expected to  run  into very  complex, unforeseeable physical and environmental
problems. That it did not do so was the result of the Brazilian  government's  strong  commitment
to the project's implementation,  and the project's inclusion  of explicit and elaborate  components
to deal with the environmental  impacts  produced  directly in areas of the project's control.  To
be sure, the project's construction triggered environmental  damage beyond its own area of
6control,  as  the roads and other facilities attracted migrants and put greater  stress on  the
surrounding  forests and watersheds. Moreover, for reasons beyond the control of the Carajas
managers,  the calculated  rates of return of the project were very disappointing  (due to low world
iron and steel prices).  Taking overall environmental  damage  into account would lower the true
rate of return further still.  Yet from a project manager's point of view, the advance planning
of environmental  mitigation  measures  was very successful  in neutralizing  potential  environmental
risks and environmentalist  opposition  that could have halted or delayed the project.
The Negative Tilt of Environmental  Impacts
Uncertain or unaddressed environmental impacts are  more likely to be negative than
positive. It is important to clarify the parameters of this assertion in two respects.  First, there
is no reason to expect that unanticipated  occurrences affecting natural resource use are more
likely to be negative than positive.  Thus a new road might attract population  settlements  that
preclude hydroelectric or irrigation development  requiring economically or politically costly
population  displacements,  but it might also expeditc the discovery  and exploitation  of valuable
ore deposits.  In short, there is no general principle that would tilt unanticipated  impacts on
resource use toward the positive or negative. Second, there are, of course, some projects that
are specifically  designed to better environmental  conditions  (e.g., reforestation  projects; dams
designed  to reduce flooding), but these benefits tend to be recognized  in project appraisal since
they comprise all or part of the rationale for the project.
When we consider the impacts  of unknown, unanticipated,  or only partially understood
occurrences on the eco-system, there are three principles that lead to the expectation of a
negative tilt.  The first derives from the prevailing societal preference that, aside from direct
project objectives, the existing ecosystem ought to be changed as little as possible; i.e.,  plant
and animal species  ought to be preserved, as should  existing forests or marshes that are not to
be transformed as a direct objective of the project; similarly, the living patterns and cultural
practices of local residents ought to be disturbed as little as possible.  It is unlikely that the
ecosystem will restore its original equilibrium following the implementatior,  of a permanent
change in production, physical structure, or both.  The ecosystem may indeed reach a new
equilibrium,  but if pre-existing  ecosystem  patterns are favored  over change, then unanticipated
changes are more likely to entail higher costs than benefits.
Second, human beings and other living creatures have to some degree adapted to the
existing  ecosystem. Food  chains, species  reproduction  chains (often  involving  complicated  plant-
animal interactions), and  geophysical balances underlie the  sustainability of  agriculture,
environmental  services, biodiversity,  and more.  Consequently,  ecosystem changes  run the risk
of jeopardizing the survival  of plant and animal species  as well as the sustainability  of existing
resources useful to people.  While it is conceivable  that an eco-system  change could disrupt the
life cycle of noxious agents (as swamp drainage has eradicated malaria-bearing  mosquitos),
significant  eco-system  change is almost guaranteed  to affect  flora and fauna involved  in positive
chains, with no parallel guarantee of effects on negative chains. Furthermore, the replacement
of species is virtually precluded within meaningful  time frames.
Third,  whereas the disruptions of  negative cycles are  often anticipated, since such
problems  are typically  subject  to much study, knowing  what it takes to avoid disturbing  positive
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link that can be disrupted in a negative ecosystem chain -- if such a link exists -- is an easier
intellectual  challenge than knowing  all of the links necessary for maintaining  a positive chain.
Again, malaria eradication is an example; knowing that malaria-carrying  mosquitos require
swampy conditions  for their reproductive  cycle is sufficient. The "causes"  of the sustainability
of positive aspects of an ecosystem  are contrastingly  unbounded.
For example, in the latest available OED survey of project performance, 21 irrigation
projects subjected  to "impact  evaluation"  five to twelve  years after their completion  were found
to have consistently  worse environmental  impacts  than anticipated  at the time of appraisal. The
ex  an  appraisals of  nearly half of  the  projects had  been upgraded on  the  promise of
environmental  improvements:  flooding prevention,  control of water-borne  diseases, and village
infrastructure improvement.  As  it  turned out,  however, the  majority of  projects had
unanticipated negative  environmental impacts,  including waterlogging (eleven projects),
salinization  (four projects), and soil erosion and sedimentation  (five projects).  In two projects
(Turkey's Seyhan Project and Sudan's Roseires Project), the indiscriminate  use of agricultural
insecticides  actually triggered a resurgence of malaria  by building up the tolerance of malarial
mosquitos  to the insecticide. (World Bank Operations  Evaluation Department  1990a:  Ch. 4)
Environmental  impact projects are especially  vulnerable  to the following  problems  that
push up costs or reduce benefits with a greater likelihood  than the reverse:
1.  Disruptions of positive interaction  chains; as noted above, these are more
likely to occur, than disruptions  of negative interaction  chains.
2.  Delays  required to mitigate  unforeseen  environmental  damage. Delays reduce
the rate of return by: (a) postponing  project benefits while capital is tied up in
project  development;  (b) exposing  the project development  to emerging  conditions
that may hamper its execution  (such as a new government  with less commitment
to the project, unplanned-for  macroeconomic  conditions, etc); and (c) exposing
the project to  inflation, which often disrupts the government's funding of a
project, leading to further delays and sometimes  the cancellation of important
project components.
3.  Delays in project initiaton and c=mpletion due to political/environmental
oposition.  A  major,  largely  uncontrollable cause  of  project  delay  is
environmentalist  opposition to government projects that impinge upon natural
systems  or entail social  disruption. Of course, environmental  opposition  can often
be salutary if it leads to improved  projects or the abandonment  of bad ones.  Yet
in some countries, such as India, environmentalist  opposition  is highly polarized
because of distrust between  non-governmental  organizations  and the government.
In such cases, governments  frequently  dismiss the predictions  of environmental
catastrophe  because they  assume that such opposition  is politically  motivated,  and
that it would arise no matter how reasonable  the project in question. A common
result  is  that  projects are  delayed by  the  opposition, but  are  eventually
undertaken.
84.  Unknown  biological  and physical conditions  that require more intensive  effort
to  achieve  the  project's  objectives.  In  addition  to  the  aforementioned
unanticipated  environmental  threats, often the physical conditions  facing project
construction  are simply more challenging  than expected.  The rock that must be
excavated for roads is harder than  predicted; natural vegetation  removal  to create
plantations  is  more  difficult  than  anticipated;  difficult  terrain  requires
unexpectedly complex engineering solutions.  One  reason  why  unknown
biological and physical conditions  tend to be more rather than less challenging  is
that project designers, ignorant  of the variability  of local conditions,  make "most
likely"  - but actually incorrect - assumptions of geophysical homogeneity.
5.  Complex  biological.  physical.  and social  reactions  that reduce  project benefits.
Typically, the engineering  of a large-scale  project begins with the premise that
the  existing physical and biological structure can  be modified in  bounded,
intentional ways, just as a sculptor typically presumes that a piece of stone or
wood can be cut as planned.  The rest of the physical and biological system is
presumed to remain intact, not to change in ways that undermine  the pursuit of
project objectives.  The behavior  of people affected by the project is presumed
to be governed  by the incentives  and opportunities  generated  by the project.  In
some cases, new social mechanisms,  such as specific water-allocation  systems
introduced  along with irrigation  works, are introduced  and applied in accordance
with this same premise.  Yet given the inter-connectedness  and equilibria of
natural and social systems, systems often change in ways that are unrelated to
project intentions  and that make  the project's positive  impact  self-limiting. Large-
scale dam projects, for example, are frequently  plagued with silting that results
from the soil erosion produced by  the project's own development; likewise,
highways in mountainous  areas draw in settlers who cultivate  steep slopes, often
resulting in land-slides  and road blockages.
6.  Unknown biological and physical conditions leading to deviations  from the
most efficient match of project scope and the natural resource base.  Since.
efficiency depends on matching project scope with the natural resource base,
uncertainty  can yield inefficiencies  in either over-estimating  or under-estimating
the natural resource  base. In a comparison  of irrigation  projects on the Pampanga
River in the Philippines  and in Northeast  Thailand,  World Bank  evaluators  noted
that poor estimations  of water inflow caused inefficiencies  regardless of whether
the  estimates were  too  high  or  too  low.  The  Philippine irrigation was
"overdesigned  relative to water  availability  and water shortages  have been a major
and  increasing problem since project completion." (World Bank Operations
Evaluation Department 1990b: 5).  The benefits of the project were, of course,
correspondingly  lower than anticipated. The Thai irrigation system, for which
estimates were based on only four years of  hydrological records, had river
inflows  40% higher than anticipated. Moreover,  water needs were overestimated,
because normal rainfall turned out to be greater than the previous four years'
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reservoir.  Thus, in this respect as well, ignorance  is likely to lead to reductions
rather than increases in the rates of return.
C.  My  Ex Ante Appraisals Are Exaggerated
While the major thrust of project design ought to focus on overcoming the problems
outlined in the section above, another crucial task is to ensure that projects will be screened  out
if they do not have adequate rates of return, whether due to environmental  impacts or other
problems. It is clear that consideration  of such problems  is inadequately  incorporated  even into
the World Bank's relatively elaborate evaluation procedure.  While the World Bank projects
mentioned  above have on average at best borderline rates of return, Kaufmann  has found that
ex an  appraisals for projects of the World Bank and its affiliates were calculated  at 22%,
excluding social sector  projects.  Recalculated rates of  return,  determined after  project
construction,  were only around 15%;  and the sample  of projects for which additional  evaluation
had been done five to eight years later showed that true rates of return were on average 10 to
11 percentage points lower than ex an  estimates.(Kaufmann  1991: 5-6) What is not known  --
and  what cannot be known from empirical examination --  is whether changes in  project
evaluation at the World Bank and other institutions  have improved this record.
Both the over-optimism  of project appraisal and the reluctance to abandon or modify
problematic  projects result from analytic limitations  and the promotional  (or political)  efforts of
individuals and institutions eager for projects to proceed.  These effects are abetted by the
'evaluation environmenr,t"  (i.e., the incentives  available  to the various participants  in the project
identification  and appraisal  process) and, perhaps less obviously,  by the structure  of the process
itself.
1.  The bias to proceed and the bias against rigorous analysis.  Institution staff and
leaders want projects to proceed.  This motive is pervasive, both at the highest levels of
government and within specific governmental  and state agencies.  With respect to the highest
political leadership,  the question  is why a government  sometimes  undertakes  projects with rates
of return lower than those that would  be generated  if the capital involved  were saved  or invested
differently. Obviously,  the political support  generated  by providing  benefits is a crucial  driving
force.  With respect to particular agencies, the bias is clearer still; after all, the main business
of agencies that formulate and undertake development  projects is to undertake these projects.
A government agency that does not utilize the funds available for development  projects often
loses power and future funds, even where the reason is laudable concern over environmental
risk.  Moreover, government  agencies that oversee development  projects are often under great
pressure to bring in the foreign  currency that external funding  provides. Sri Lanka's Mahaweli
Dam Scheme is a prominent  case in point (Levy 1989; Ascher & Healy 1990).
Other parties, particularly  consultants  who participate  in pre-approval  project evaluation
and the contractors who carry out project construction, also have incentives  to underestimate
both costs and time requirements  during the pre-approval  phase; this is especially so in cases
where the consultants  =  the contractors. Consultants  often want project preparation  to proceed
10as long as possible, so that they can continue to work on the project's analysis.  An early
indication that a project is not feasible might cut off further opportunities to  work on that
project, or antagonize  government  officials  bent on pursuing  the project.
Contractors, who are often asked to submit preliminary indications  of possible  project
costs, have an obvious interest in getting projects approved  even if costs are underestimated,  so
long as the government  will pay more once actual costs are known.  Contractors  are willing to
underestimate  costs because the government  typically  bears the risk for cost overruns, whether
occasioned  by the need to redesign  the project, to mitigate  environmental  damage,  or to complete
the core of the project once geophysical  conditions  are more fully known. Ironically, the receipt
of international  funding  may exacerbate  this problem; if a government  has made its support for
a project known  to international  funding  agencies, then it becomes  harder for it to cancel or cut
back on a project that proves to have higher-than-anticipated  costs.  In the case of Nepal's
Kulekhani  Hydroelectric  Project, the pre-approval  estimate  of the civil works construction  costs
was US$27 million.  Once the project was approved  and competitive  bidding was opened, the
lowest bid tendered  was US$64.8 million. Essential  design modifications  accounted  for US$7.4
million of the additional  construction  costs.
By the same token, the main business of development  funding  institutions,  whether  they
are the World Bank, the Inter-American  Development  Bank, USAID or other international  or
bilateral agencies, is to grant or lend money for development. A funding  agency that cannot
expend its grant or loan allocation is widely  regarded as failing in its job.  This does not mean
that project evaluators knowingly  and cynically  approve bad projects simply to fulfill lending
targets. But it does mean that the urgency to identify fundable  projects colors the evaluator's
predisposition  to give project proposals  the benefit  of the doubt. Moreover,  the evaluative  effort
itself is a  burden to  the typical development agency and to  its personnel responsible for
formulating,  evaluating  or undertaking  the project. Effective  project analysis requires time and
manpower; elaborate analysis thus detracts from the capacity to engage in expansive  activities
(such as further project identification)  and/or the capacity to undertake  the same level of effort
more cost-effectively.
The liabilities  of undertaking  rigorous analysis extend down to the sub-institutional  and
individual  levels.  Project-formulation  units and their personnel  typically  stand to gain more in
funds, bureaucratic  power,  job security and personal  advancement  when they are associated  with
ambitious development programs.  The top management of governmental and international
development  agencies are often aware of this bias, and in some cases may share it.  When it
tries to impose analytic rigor, top management  has little hope of success. Simple declarations
of the requirement of analytic rigor as institutional  policy are unlikely to have a significant
effect. Little and Mirrlees, who document  the World Bank's failure to get its own staff to adopt
moderately  rigorous cost-benefit  analysis for its projects, argue that:
(G]ood project appraisal is done by people with their own incentives, within
organizations that wittingly or not set these incentives.  Both environments  of
project appraisal, the intellectual  and the political-organizational,  are keys to the
quality of selection  overall. This needs to be most seriously  considered  by those
who manage  and create these environments." (Little and Mirrlees 1991: 377)
11Lyn Squire, the author of the World Bank's most ambitious appraisal methodology,
agrees:
To  be  successful this approach to  implementation [of rigorous cost-benefit
analysis applied voluntarily by  World Bank staff] requires two ingredients:
enough well-qualified  analysts to conduct the appraisals  and an environment  that
encourages  such effort. The World Bank had the first but not the second. (Squire
1991: 383)
It is important  to understand why mere insistence on rigorous environmental  analysis is
unenforceable. Lacking  parallel evaluations,  managers are not in a position to know whether
environmental  appraisals  are genuinely careful or not.  The same number of words can be put
to paper, with the same apparent level of detail and seriousness. Supervisors' relative lack of
information  about  project specifics  makes it extrer  :y  difficult  for them to second-guess  analysts
who have more first-hand  information.
2.  Limits to analysis of environmental  impacts. The use of ostensibly  neutral technical
analysis to  promote favored outcomes beyond simply endorsing technical findings, is made
possible by authentic limits to analytic capacity.  Everyone involved in project appraisal can
point to cases of  evaluators knowingly inflating rates of return.  Yet it is the range of
uncertainty, itself the result of real limits to analytic  capacity, that allows promotionally-biased
estimates to  maintain their plausibility.  Thus, while it might seem at first glance that the
governmental  motive to have projects approved  so that funding  with be forthcoming  constitutes
a sufficient explanation of distortions in reported rates of return, there are other necessary
conditions. For one thing,  when costs and benefits are accurately  known, inflated appraisals
risk the loss of professional and career standing.  Moreover, in  order to  mislead funding
institutions, governments  must be able to make a plausible case for higher rates of return  --
or funding  agencies  must have  a similar compulsion  to fund projects regardless  of their true rate
of return.
Environmental  damage  and natural-resource  constraints  are under-appreciated  because  of
intrinsic analytic difficulties and the lack of effort typically devoted to analysis.  Intrinsic
limitations arise from the complexity and inevitable uncertainty surrounding environmental
impact projects, which (by definition) involve the interaction of physical and social systems.
Moreover, the physical and biological  interactions  within  typical  eco-systems  are only minimally
understood.  Virtually all the discussion  above of the net negative implications  of uncertainty
could be repeated to explain how analytic limitations, particularly for environmental-impact
projects, are associated  with lower-than-expected  rates of return.
The level of analytic effort that has gone into project formulation  and evaluation has
traditionally underemphasized  environmental analysis.  This is not only because of the late
development  of environmental  consciousness  and the methodologies  of environmental  analysis,
but also because of the peripheral status  of environmental  concerns in the very earliest, but often
definitive, stages of defining project objectives.  Except for the handful of projects explicitly
designed for environmental  improvement,  the environmental  impacts of development  projects
12are by-products, not their raison d'etre.  Most attention  is devoted to designing  a project so as
to achieve its central objectives, not to whether  it will generate other consequences.
The treatment of low-probability  catastrophes suffers  from similar inadequacies. Often
there are  many low-probability  occurrences, any one of  which could result in  very large
overruns and delays.  Yet because the projected  probability  of such occurrences is small, their
implications  are not typically  analyzed,  nor are the probabilities  of all such possible  occurrences
aggregated in  order  to  calculate the  probability that  "something major" will go  wrong.
Contingency  funds may be established  to address the possibility  of unanticipated  problems. Yet
the typical fund, set at some moderate  percentage of either total costs or specific  components,
reflects a presumption  that the occurrence  of an unanticipated  condition  or event will have only
a moderate  impact, rather than the often more common  outcome  of a serious impact that could
result from any number of (individually)  unlikely occurrences.
Moreover, the treatment of uncertainty, even in more rigorous approaches to project
appraisal, does not take into account  the imbalance  of negative  and positive uncertainties. Even
the Little and Mirrlees approach  assumes that unidentified  consequences  are equally likely  to be
positive or negative. They suggest that rates of return be downgraded  in the face  of uncertainty,
but only because of, and to the degree that, risk aversion makes a negative  departure from the
expected outcome moi, costly than a positive departure of the same magnitude  is beneficial in
its consequences. (Little  and Mirrlees 1990: 356-7; 379-80)
3.  Presuming implementation. A project document developed  by a government  is a
pE=sal,  not only to the funding institution, but also to other actors within the country.  This
does not necessarily mean that it is deliberately  biased to emphasize the positive, but it does
mean that it is a declaration of what that government  proposes to be done, not what would
emerge if it were blocked or significantly resisted.  Forecasted rates of return are therefore
implicitly conditional on  governmental plans proceeding forward more-or-less as planned.
Forecasting  disruptions  to planned schedules  is so daunting  that it is rarely attempted;  the timing
of  with which possible political conflicts generated by projects are resolved is particularly
difficult to forecast. This does not excuse governments  from taking into account  the effects of
technical  and  political  delays,  such  as  slippages in  drawing  up  detailed engineering
specifications,  adapting to unanticipated  site conditions,  and actually executing the work.  Yet
the overruns and delays that result from opposition  within the country, or from requirements  to
modify plans so  to  achieve acceptance by  internal constituencies or  the  external funding
institution,  are generally not included  in the characterization  of the initiative  that constitutes  the
government's  proposal. Often  the proposal  is more of a negotiating  proposition  than a prediction
of a negotiated  outcome.
One of the most subtle but damaging  implications  of presuming  that projects will proceed
'according to plan" is the exaggeration  of the potential  for implementation. When projects have
institution-strengthening  as well as  operational components, it is  usually and unjustifiably
assumed that the operations will be undertaker.  by the upgraded, and thus more competent,
administration.  For  example, in  Liberia the World Bank supported a  combined forestry
plantation  and institutional  upgrading  project of the Forest Development  Authority. The project
appraisal report noted the weakness of the existing administrative  structure; indeed, without
recognizing  this weakness, there would have  been no rationale  for the institutional  strengthening
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of weak institutional capacity.  The results of the plantation component of the project were
disastrous. To a significant  degree, the managerial  and institutional  weaknesses  of the FDA and
the project management  account  for this failure. Initial indications  that the quantities  of bio-mass
that would have to be removed  in order to make way for pine planting  had been underestimated,
generated only an extremely slow response.  They should have triggered a rethinking of the
requirements  for weeding, and indeed of whether the transformation  to pine cultivation  would
result in greater yields than natural forest management.
For projects requiring international funding, the question is whether appraisers from
domestic  governments  znd from external funding  institutions  have the same  orientation  to project
proposals that project formulators  have.  Even project appraisers from the World Bank, tend to
adopt this kind of outlook to some degree. World Bank  evaluators,  to the degree that their own
recommendations  are reflected  in project  design, are themselves  making  a conditional  proposal -
- "If the project is allowed  to proceed in such  and such a way, and implemented  as planned, then
the following  outcomes can be expected."
Moreover, in  many cases, the distinctions between project formulator/designer and
project evaluator  are very blurred; indeed it is often efficient for evaluators  to provide feedback
with which project designers can improve designs.  In effect, this transforms evaluators into
project formulators.  The problem then is  that this kind of  blurring reduces evaluators'
psychological  and political  detachment  from projects.
4.  The bias to project commitment. Premature  commitment  to specific  project designs
makes it  harder  to  adapt projects to  avoid  environmental damage.  Typically, project
identification proceeds by articulating objectives -- i.e., potential benefits -- and then establishing
effective  means to those ends.  Means, of course, entail costs. Thus the examination  of project
costs -- in terms of direct cost and the indirect damage cost of its impact -- generally comes well
after the project has been defined.  If a government  makes an early commitment  to a project,
that decision is usually driven by the project benefits and rarely by its costs, which tend to
emerge gradually as the project's details are fleshed  out.  For example, early on in the design
process, it is often impossible to  say what specific environmental  impact a dam will have,
because the specific location of the dam (and thus the location of the reservoir) is established
only after further engineering  studies.
While  there is much evidence  that a government's  commitment  to a given project is very
important for its success, it is also true that this commitment  makes it more difficult for the
government  to tolerate delays, reductions in scope, or any changes  other than those making the
project more grand and impressive. Little and Mirrlees (1991: 370) point out that "[i]t has been
repeated ad nauseam  that economic  appraisal at a late stage very rarely stops a project. It must
be applied early on to stop work on the project or to effect improvements  in the design of a
project that will finally go ahead."  When announced projects are dropped or  significantly
changed, those who believed that they would otherwise have stood to gain frequently feel
beaayed.  To back projects -- and receive credit for them -- governments typically make public
commitments (often  with  much fanfare) to  specific project designs  and  timetables.  A
govemment's credibility  is enhanced  if projects start promptly  and are implemented  fully; it may
also obtain more hard currency, as  well as  greater  scope for public-works employment.
14Conversely, it  is  very  difficult to  convey the rationale for slow project formulation and
postponemenit  of construction;  and where there is domestic  opposition  to a project, governments
may be concerned that a  cautionary approach will be  viewed as a  sign of  governmental
weakness.
5.  "Heroic" projects.  "Heroic" projects often provide greater  rewards  for  the
governments  and analysts  associated  with them. One reason for some  of the most disappointing
rates of return is that projects are sometimes  formulated  as bold, short-cut  approaches  to solving
problems.  These bold formulations  are often forecast to  have lower costs than less bold
alternatives. Yet project boldness, if defined as adopting  untried approaches, will result more
in unanticipated overruns and delaying conditions than in surprising discoveries of ways to
reduce project costs and completion  time, for all the same reasons that uncertainty tends in
general to increase costs over benefits.
For example, in Costa Rica  the mid-1970s  highway  expansion  linking  the Caribbean  coast
to San Jose could have paralleled the existing  roads, at high cost due to the circuitousness  of the
existing route, or it could have cut through  the Zurqui  Pass. This mountain  pass route had never
before been tried; the geological conditions were to a significant  degree unknown. yet its ex
ante calculated rate  of  return of  18% was higher than the  14% estimated for the  more
conventional  route.  As it turned out, the road construction  took nearly eleven years, rather than
the expected four and a half.  Construction  costs were only modestly  above the predicted  costs,
but delays led to a rate of return of at best 8-10% -- even before environmental  problems are
factored into the calculation.
However, this kind of boldness, although foolhardy  from the perspective of the nation
as a whole, can have a political rationale for governments and a professional rationale for
analysts.  "Heroic" transformations  of natural systems  imply that if such a project succeeds,  the
government  in question may have impressive, highly visible benefits to dispense. Bold efforts
similarly promise a more professional  challenge  and greater recognition  for project designers.
The Costa Rican road designers, for instance, were firmly committed  to attempting  the more
challenging  engineering  feat.
The heroic  impulse and the desire to exercise  engineering  virtuosity  also colors responses
to potential problems.  When environmental  difficulties are foreseen, they are often taken as
problems to address rather thai as fatal impediments  to a project's progression;  it is widely
assumed  that their resolution must be feasible. For example, the mid-1970s  Fifth Development
Program of the Companhia Hidro Eletrica do Dao Francisco (CHESF) in Brazil's Northeast
entailed a displacement  of 70,000 people and the flooding of previously cultivated farmland.
Farmland was to be protected through  project additions  and resettlement  was to be carried out
through the project, with resettlement costs considered as normal project expenses.  In fact,
resettlement  was considerably  more expensive  than had been anticipated.
6.  Reactions to environmental criticism.  The low credibility of many environmental
groups may deter governments from taking environmental warnings seriously.  The same
estrangement between governments and non-governmental  environmental organizations that
causes project delays, often inures govemments  to constructive  criticism  of project design and
can lead them to ignore the reality of genuine environmental  risks.  On occasion, the leaders  of
15a  governmental agency that is committed to  a  particular project will develop a  similarly
adversarial  relationship towards  environmentally-concerned  govemment  officials  and/or
international  funders.  Environmental  warnings  may  go unheeded;  in more extreme  cases, there
may be deliberate efforts to suppress information  about environmental  risks.
D. Remedies
Project Design
The twin problems of poor projects and poor appraisals can be attacked by altering
standard approaches  to project design and the project-selection  process. We first consider how
to improve policy  designs in order to accomplish  two objectives:  the reduction  of environmental-
impact risk and the reduction of incentives  to proceed with problematic  projects.
1.  Favoring maintenance  and rehabilitation  over "fronitier"  projects.  If many of the
projects with highly disappointing  rates of return are "bold" efforts to initiate penetration  into
natural systems  rather than  to improve  or augment  existing  penetrations,  then an institutionalized
bias in favor of maintenance  and rehabilitation  projects  over "frontier"  projects may  be in order.
It has long been recognized  that rehabilitation  projects, such as road maintenance  or correcting
the flaws of irrigation and hydroelectric  systems, often have handsome  rates of return.  They
also have lower potential  for environmental  damage. The example  of Rwanda's Fourth Highway
Project, cited above, typifies the low "downside  environmental  risk" of rehabilitation  projects.
2.  Program over project approaches.  One approach to  addressing the  fact that
governments  form nearly irrevocable  commitments  to highly visible  projects is to de-emphasize
specific projects in favor of broader commitments  to  programs.  If governments find that
commitments to  programs can  also generate political support, then they may have more
flexibility in altering specific components  of the program without risking the appearance of
reneging  on promises. If, for example, we compare  Sri Lanka's Mahaweli  Dam Scheme,  which
involved  a large and changing  program of dams and irrigation  networks, with the Aswan High
Dam, we find that the former initiative had the potential for myriad mid-course  corrections
(although  unfortunately  the Sri Lankan  governments  did not sufficiently  avail themselves  of this
opportunity),  whereas  the Aswan High Dam initiative  had little room  for adjustment  as more  was
learned about the project's likely consequences.
3.  Project designs that permit adaptive management. Several design dimensions  can
address the potential  to make mid-course  corrections:
(a) If the sequencing of project work begins with the most problematic and
uncertain components  of projects, project designs can be changed, or projects
aborted, before enormous costs are incurred.
(b) In so far as environmental  mitigation  actions necessitate  project delays if they
begin during the middle  or late stages  of project construction  -- which is typically
the case -- it is preferable  to address environmental  mitigation  needs as much as
16possible in the early phases of a project, so as to avoid tying up other project
capital.
4.  Reducing the "rent" compQnent  of development  projects.  The basic dynamic that
leads governments  to push for projects despite low actual rates of return can be undermined  by
severing, or at least weakening, the existing "political  economy" of project benefits, in which
the latter are allotted to recipients from whom governments  then expect gratitude and political
support.  Ernesto Fontaine (1991: 390-1) notes that
projects that do not charge users for the goods and services produced -- or that
do not charge beneficiaries  for the projects' investment  costs...  may be of great
relevance for understanding  the "political  economy" of government investment.
It is clear that making the beneficiaries  pay for the project will help to avoid
political pressures to build irrigation  dams, roads, or ports, when and where the
national interest is not best served...
It may seem  quixotic  to try to undermine  the fundamental  connection  between  government
benefits and government  support  -- a connection  that some theorists  have declared  as the essence
of political systems (Easton 1960).  Yet that is precisely what user charges are all about, and
they have had some -- albeit limited -- effect.
Institutions and Processes
Approaches  that pertain to the project-selection  process address institutional  structure  as
well as the project formulation  and approval process per  e.
1.  Intemalizing the institutional  costs of environmental  risks.  The core issue is not so
much whether institutions are prone to the analytical, procedural and political impediments
outlined above, but rather whether institutions  act to minimize  these obstacles. An underlying
problem, then, is that the individuals  and institutions  subject to these problems typically  have
little incentive to avoid them.  Frequently incentives are lacking because the costs of poor
projects do not accrue to individuals  and institutions  involved  in evaluation; indeed, they may
benefit from involvement  in project development,  and yet be immune  from the repercussions  of
ultimate project failure.  The key challenge, then, is  to  have individuals and  institutions
internalize some of the costs of undertaldng  poor projects.
Internalizing  the costs of undertaling poor projects requires that the same individuals  or
institutions  be concerned with project development  and project management. This is far more
feasible than expecting to hold evaluators responsible for errors that only emerge years later.
It  is,  however, difficult to  ensure the  continuity or  transfer of  individuals from project
development to project management.  Therefore the most promising avenue is institutional
restructuring  that requires the agencies  involved  in project development  to face the consequences
of poor projects; these include the financial drain of administering  low-return projects or of
efforts to ameliorate  environmental  consequences,  the embarrassment  of association  with failure
and environmental  damage.
17There are three avenues for internalizing  these costs.  The most obvious and direct way
is to establish  geographically-based  development  authorities  responsible  for planning,  executing,
and administering  development  projects. It makes  sense for these  authorities  to cover entire eco-
systems, so that environmental  impacts  within the eco-system  will not be externalized. As long
as such an authority depends  on sustainable  development  for its long-term  survival  and stability,
low-return projects will be avoided. This is one rationale  for institutions  such as river basin or
watershed  authorities. For example, in Morocco  the Oum er R'bia river authority, ORMVAD,
responsible for implementing the  large-scale irrigation system and providing agricultural
services, has been given the major credit for the success  of the Doukkala  I and II projects. The
World Bank's impact evaluation six years after the start-up of Doukkala I operations credited
ORMVAD for its "strong and effective management  performance." (World Bank Operations
Evaluation  Department 1989: i)  In India, the Damodar  Valley  Corporation  had much promise
as an institution for developing  and  administering  the series of dams and irrigation systems in
that river valley; unfortunately  the rivalry between state authorities  and the central government
resulted in the weakening  of the Corporation  when it proved to be successful.  (Ascher and Healy
1990: 113-115)
Second, where  agencies  integrating project  formulation and  management can  be
established, they should be allowed to establish  reserve funds.  The near financial  autonomy  of
Morocco's ORMVAD, for example, not only provides it with discretion  and accountability,  but
also an institutional  interest in being involved  only in viable projects. More typically, agencies
have little to risk from poor projects and accompanying  environmental  damages.  1i a project
requires  efforts to mitigate  environmental  damage,  the managing  agency  usually  receives  tunding
from  the  central  government or  subnational government, and  thus  avoids  the  financial
consequences  of environmental  problems. However, if funding  has to come from the managing
agency's  reserve  fund -- which  could be  used for other purposes -- then that agency  faces a
tangible  cost in launching  an environmentally  risky project. It is important  that the reserve fund
be available for other purposes as well, so that agency managers  do not conclude that the only
way they can avail themselves  of the fund is to create the need for environmental  mitigation.
Third, if an integrated formulation  and management  agency cannot be established, then
those agencies  that evaluate, implement,  and operate development  projects can at least  be placed
within the same ministry. While each of these functions  units may be different, and potentially
at odds, the highest  level ministerial  authorities  will have to confront the costs of pursuing poor
projects.
2.  Enhancing  the impact of independent  evaluation. If project-formulating  institutions
cannot be fully disciplined through the internalization  of the costs of project-selection  errors,
then the voices of other institutions,  those without  a stake in proceeding  with the project, ought
to be strengthened. This can be done in four ways.
First,  evaluating agencies  can  be  institutionally separated  and  insulated  from
implementing  agencies that have an incentive to undertake  projects even if they have low rates
of return.  If evaluative  agencies are staffed by individuals  with strong professional  incentives
to apply rigorous analysis, then the rationale  for caution in the face of environmental  risk may
be more powerful than the alternative.
18Some  progress in this direction has been made  by the World Bank  since its reorganization
in 1987. A large proportion  of the World Bank's environmental  specialists  are now  on the staffs
of  the technical departments for each region, rather than reporting to the country program
departments.  They are therefore less susceptible  to pressures from project division chiefs or
country department  directors to overlook or minimize  environmental  risks.  It is true that both
departments  report to the regional  vice president, who  is surely concerned  with the need  to fulfill
the lending quota planned for that region, but at the regional level the loss of any particular
project only marginally detracts from the objective  of meeting  the overall lending targets.
Second,  the discussion  of project evaluations  as proposals  rather than predictions  implies
a  strong need for completely independent evaluation. If an evaluating unit cannot itself be
insulated, it can be overseen or evaluated  by other appraisal  experts. Little and Mirrlees (1991:
358) offer as possibilities the independent  appraisal of randomly selected  projects shortly after
the original appraisal, and grading of appraisal quality by independent inspectors.  These
schemes would adjust rates of return for projects examined, and would reinforce the incentives
for good appraisal and the risks of poor appraisal. A promising development  along these lines
was the expert Board of Review established  in 1981 by Colombian  authorities along with the
World Bank loan for the Guavio Hydroelectric  Project.  The Colombian  authorities  had earlier
disregarded the World Bank's recommendation  to establish such a Board for the Las Mesitas
Hydroelectric  Project, which suffered from gross underestimation  of project costs and delays.
Third, other agencies, free of the bias to proceed with problematic  projects, can be given
enough power to veto, or at least to delay, the projects until both project design and appraisal
are more acceptable.  An encouraging  case is India's Indira Reservoir, which was successfully
redesigned after opposition  from the Indian government's Finance Ministry, Department  of the
Environment,  and Wildlife  Department  demonstrated  their potential  to kill the project altogether.
(Ascher and Healy 1990: 120-130)
Fourth,  responsible participation by  non-governmental organizations can  strongly
reinforce the discipline  imposed by watch-dog  governmental  agencies.  For NGO participation
to be responsible, it must avoid the common tendencies to attack all environmental  impact
projects and employ environmental  criticism  as a vehicle for political  purposes. As the case of
India's  Narmada Valley clearly indicates, when envi ,nmentalist groups are  seen  to  be
automatially  confrontational, the credibility of their inputs suffers drastically. (Ascher and
Healy 1990: 115-120)
3.  Expanding the knowledge base.  It is important to keep in mind the lesson that
partisan analysis is strongly abetted  by analytic limitations. Ignorance  and uncertainty  provide
the latitude for analysts and policymakers  to select adequately  credible technical  judgments that
coincide with their promotional  objectives.  Where uncertainty  is minimal, and the costs and
benefits of particular initiatives and project designs are widely known and accepted, it is of
course more difficult to slant technical  analysis with any plausibility.
With  respect  to  specific projects  already  identified,  more  analysis  of  possible
environmental  consequences  is clearly called for.  Environmental  impact statements must be
obligatory.  The question is how to ensure that formulating  and evaluating agents, who have
incentives  to avoid raising environmental  red flags, will pursue environmental  analyses in good
faith.  The method now employed by the World Bank, namely to designate projects with the
19potential to  have significant environmental impacts as  requiring full environmental impact
assessments,  has considerable  promise.  It may still be that environmental  specialists  may  be too
overworked to carry out a sufficiently  thr rough assessment,  and that project staff interested  in
having a project proceed will participate perfunctorily  in its assessment.  Yet the more subtle
consequence of this arrangement is  that project staff end up with less interest in pursuing
projects  with environmental  consequences  in the first place, because  they  recognize  the additional
work of  undertaking environmental  assessments and the risk that assessments may uncover
problems  that would either scuttle  a project or require even more effort.  The potential  liability
of this system is that the additional man-hours  and risk entailed in developing  projects with
environmental  impacts  may create a bias against  identifying  rural development  projects -- where
much of the most abject poverty is still located. It may be argued that it is environmental  risks
yer  , not this approach to assessing  them, that makes rural development  more problematic  than
previously  appreciated. Yet it is possible to identify  a large pool of rural projects, and on the
basis of thorough  study weed out those with unacceptably  large environmental  risks and modify
or adopt the others.
With reference to future  projects, it should  be noted that natural-resource-base  knowledge
has much more value than currently implied by the haphazard pursuit of geological surveys,
meteorological  surveys, hydrological  surveys, and soil analyses, in most developing  countries.
The obvious retort is that development often cannot wait for the painstaking accumulation  of
knowledge. But the essential  point is that greater resources should  be devoted to efforts to map
out physical and biological conditions in general, not so much because today's project should
be postponed, but so that such information  will be available for the next decade's projects.  If
an important  diagnosis  of why resources are squandered  is that ignorance  prevents  policymakers
from reaLizing  what is lost when development  projects liquidate  existing resources, then resource
inventories  are an obvious corrective: e.g.,  volume of biomass  that would have to be removed
for the plantation  to proceed; knowledge  of biodiversity;  assessments  of the value of non-timber
extractive resources.
4.  Institutionalizing  environmental caution.  The simplest deterrent to unwarranted
optimism is deliberate pessimism.  It is not feasible to make simple adjustments to ex an
calculations, because estimated returns are not uniformly exaggerated -- there is no standard
"deflator".  Nonetheless, appraisal reviewers can certainly be more conscious of the general
pattern of uncertain  or unknown  impacts  being more negative than positive.
In cost-benefit  analysis, the known consequences  of environmental  impacts should, of
course, be represented as costs or benefits.  Yet the treatment of  the risk of unidentifiable
environmental  consequences  has to be handled  carefully. If the environmental  costs of a project
are easily known, there is no special problem.  The challenge  comes when even the nature of
the costs cannot be anticipated; for example, if a hitherto-unknown  pest proliferates after its
predator's habitat has been eliminated.  One approach is to regard each development  project
within a particular, narrow class (e.g., monoculture  plantation forestry with an exotic species)
as having a presumptive cost, set at the average environmental  cost of previously evaluated
projects of that type.  For example, it would be reasonable  to calculate the average decline  in
actual rates of return to North India's major irrigation  projects launched  in the 1980s that was
due to unanticipated  environmental  consequences  (e.g., salinization  and waterlogging). If these
20effects,  on average,  account  for a two  or three  percentage  point  decline  in rates  of return,  then
this figure  should  be added  to the specific  estimate  of knowable  expenditures  and damages  to
generate  a full  calculation  of costs.  The  net effect,  of course,  is to reduce  the number  of projects
that exceed  the pre-established  minimum  rate of return.
E.  Outlook  and ConclusiQns
Has there been  progress  in designing  better  development  projects  and appraising  them
more  accurately?  Can  more  progress  be expected?  It is, of course,  impossible  to find  empirical
verification  that projects  now being  launched  are more  effectively  screened  for environmental
damage  and other return-reducing  problems. The only definitive  empirical  basis for such a
conclusion  would have to come  after the environmental  impacts,  costs, and benefits  of such
projects  are known. Today  we  can only  evaluate  the projects  of a decade  ago, not more  recent
projects  that have  been  subjected  to apparently  greater  environmental  concern  and scrutiny.
The most commonly-invoked  basis for optimism  is the greater prominence  of the
environment  as an issue.  There  is a widespread,  but empirically  unverifiable,  view that the
kinds  of environmentally  problematic  projects  that would  have  been  approved  in the 1970s  or
early 1980s  would  now  be unthinkable,  and certainly  ineligible  for  international  funding. Some
institutions,  including  the World  Bank, the Inter-American  Development  Bank  and the U.S.
Agency  for International  Development,  have  intensified  the environmental  screening  contained
in the project  evaluation  process. It is, of course,  encouraging  to note that the staff  appraisal
reports  of these institutions  now include  environmental  assessments  as a matter  of course  for
projects  with  potential  environmental  effects  (see, for example,  Butcher  1990).
However,  this attention  to environmental  risk has not yet provoked  those structural
changes  in governmental  institutions  that  would  allow  for  the development  of incentives  that  give
proper  weight  to environmental  risks. The fundamental  political  economy  of early  commitment
to grandiose  projects  of uncertain  environmental  consequence  has not been  overturned.
The development  of  appraisal methodologies  is also inconclusive.  While more
sophisticated  approaches  are being  developed,  their  utilization  is still  surprisingly  limited  (Little
and  Mirrlees  1991). The future  development  of  project  appraisal  methodologies  is important  not
only  to assist  properly  motivated  analysts  and  policymakers  to screen  out poor  projects,  but  also
to hold  them  accountable  for their  ex ante  appraisals.  If ex post  appraisal  does  not capture  most
significant  environmental  costs, analysts  conducting  ex an  appraisals  will not tend to worry
about  being  caught  out by their exaggerations  or disregard  for environmental  consequences.
The general  context  of policy reform  and structural  adjustment  is, perhaps, the most
important  factor  in tilting  toward  an optimistic  prognosis. The general  movement  to eliminate
the logic  of blatant  risk-seeking  and  to make  governmental  institutions  accountable  for the  results
of their own actions,  has the potential  to bring these  reforms  to the challenge  of dealing  with
environmental-impact  projects  in a far more  sober  and  realistic  fashion.  In this respect,  although
the conditionalities  required  by international  funding  institutions  can play a useful  supporting
role, the primary  responsibility  of designing  and selecting  appropriate  environmental-impact
projects  still lies with the governments  of the developing  world.
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